CHRISTIE JUSTUS LAW — RESEARCH PAPERS
CJL-WP 2026/01

Compliance as Legislation

Domesticating the FATF Standards in Guyana's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act

Naomi Eglantine Christie

September 2026

Naomi Eglantine Christie · LL.B. (Distinction) · L.E.C. (Honours) · LL.M., New York University, 2015 — International Legal Studies · Attorney-at-Law, admitted to the Bar of Guyana, October 2013, and to the Bar of Grenada, 2014. The author served as State Counsel (Litigation and Legislative Drafting) in the Attorney General's Chambers and Ministry of Legal Affairs of Guyana, where her duties included legislative drafting in the anti-money-laundering field; this paper is written from that chair. Correspondence: naomi@christiejustuslaw.com.

Abstract

Small states that live under mutual evaluation legislate in a particular way. This paper asks what kind of law results when a statute is written to an assessor's methodology, on the assessor's calendar and in the assessor's vocabulary. It answers by reading Guyana's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009, its eight amending Acts and the Guyana Compliance Commission Act 2023 against the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force's fourth-round Mutual Evaluation Report of 2024. The argument is that, in such a state, compliance is itself a mode of legislation: the Recommendation supplies the outline, the assessment criteria supply the sections, the on-site date supplies the deadline, and Parliament supplies the form. What results is technically strong and structurally derivative, a statute amended in waves that follow the evaluation cycle rather than any domestic criminology. Alvarez's account of international organisations as law-makers, Koh's transnational legal process and the Chayeses' managerial model of compliance are each put to that record, and each is found incomplete for a state with no vote in the standard-setting body. The 2024 evaluation — technical ratings largely compliant, effectiveness ratings largely moderate, no conviction for money laundering — is then read as the predictable output of the process described, and three lessons are drawn from the drafting chair, on offence design, supervisory institutions and commencement.

Keywords: money laundering; FATF; Guyana; CFATF; legislative drafting; soft law; mutual evaluation; transnational legal process

Suggested citation: Naomi Eglantine Christie, 'Compliance as Legislation: Domesticating the FATF Standards in Guyana's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act' (2026) Christie Justus Law Research Paper CJL-WP 2026/01 <https://christiejustuslaw.com/research/>.

I. Introduction

On 16 August 2023 the Official Gazette of Guyana carried, in a single Legal Supplement, two statutes: the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2023, in forty-eight sections, and the Guyana Compliance Commission Act 2023, in seventy-four.[1] Nineteen days later an assessment team of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force began its on-site visit to Georgetown, which ran from 4 to 15 September 2023.[2] The Mutual Evaluation Report that resulted records the amendments of August 2023 without surprise, credits them wherever a criterion is met, and notes in passing that the Commission which the second Act created had not been constituted by the end of the visit.[3] Nothing in that sequence was irregular. That is where this paper begins.

The Constitution provides that, subject to its provisions, "Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Guyana".[4] In form, the two Acts of August 2023 are exactly what article 65 contemplates: a Bill, a passage, an assent, a gazette. In substance, their content had been settled elsewhere — by forty Recommendations adopted by a body Guyana has never joined, read through an assessment methodology written by that body, and applied by assessors drawn from four other jurisdictions on a timetable fixed by the regional body's evaluation calendar.[5] The question this paper asks is what kind of law results when a statute is made in this way, and whether the answer accounts for the evaluation record Guyana now carries: technical compliance ratings that are, with five exceptions, compliant or largely compliant; effectiveness ratings that are, with two exceptions, moderate; and, fifteen years after the offence was enacted, no conviction for money laundering.[6]

The argument advanced here is my own, and it can be stated in a sentence. In a small state living under mutual evaluation, compliance is itself a mode of legislation. The Recommendation supplies the outline; the assessment criteria supply the sections; the on-site date supplies the deadline; and Parliament supplies the form. Law made in this mode has a recognisable shape. It is written to the assessor's methodology rather than to a domestic theory of the harm, on the assessor's calendar rather than the legislature's, and in the Recommendation's vocabulary, so that the words of the standard reappear as the words of the statute. The product is technically strong. It is also structurally derivative, amended in waves that follow the evaluation cycle rather than any domestic criminology. A statute drafted to a rubric proves itself on the page before it proves itself in a courtroom, and the distance between those two proofs is what the 2024

[1] Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2023 (Guyana), Act No 15 of 2023, Official Gazette (Legal Supplement A) 16 August 2023; Guyana Compliance Commission Act 2023 (Guyana), Act No 14 of 2023, Official Gazette (Legal Supplement A) 16 August 2023. Each Act bears the President's assent dated 16 August 2023. Short forms hereafter: AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023; Compliance Commission Act 2023.

[2] CFATF, *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures — The Co-operative Republic of Guyana: Mutual Evaluation Report* (CFATF, July 2024) para 1 and Preface (hereafter 'MER').

[3] MER paras 44, 59 and 248; Annex A, criterion 28.3.

[4] Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Cap 1:01, art 65(1).

[5] MER, Preface: the assessment team comprised officials of Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Dominica and the Cayman Islands, supported by the CFATF Secretariat; the evaluation "was based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations and was prepared using the 2013 Methodology".

[6] MER, Table 1 (Effectiveness Ratings) and Table 2 (Technical Compliance Ratings); para 10 ("Guyana has had no convictions for ML in the jurisdiction").

evaluation measured.

Three bodies of scholarship stand nearest this question, and the paper parts company with each of them. José Alvarez has shown that international organisations make law through instruments the doctrine of sources cannot see, and that much of that law is "soft".[7] The FATF standard, as it reaches Georgetown, is Alvarez's soft law with the softness taken out: no treaty, no vote, and obedience secured not by legal obligation but by the dependence of a small open economy on correspondent banking. Harold Koh has argued that nations obey international law because norms are internalised through a transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation and internalisation.[8] In Guyana the internalisation is real, but it is achieved by deadline rather than by persuasion, and the interpretive phase is performed by the assessor rather than by the domestic courts. Abram and Antonia Chayes have described a "managerial" model in which compliance is produced by transparency, reporting, capacity-building and justification rather than by sanction.[9] Mutual evaluation is that model's most developed instrument. But the Chayeses assumed a treaty regime whose parties had consented to its terms, and here the manager is a body the state has not joined. The better view, respectfully, is that none of the three accounts describes the process completely, because each assumes that the state whose compliance is in question agreed, at some point, to the instrument it is complying with.

The method is textual. I read the principal Act of 2009 section by section where the sections matter, read each of its eight amending Acts and the Compliance Commission Act against the dates on which they were passed and gazetted, and read all of them against the criteria the 2024 Report applies. Where the Report quotes a criterion and cites a section, the transposition can be watched happening. I also draw on what the process looks like from inside a drafting room; that account is offered as evidence of method, not as biography.

The order is this. Section II places the standard-setter and its regional body, and the conventions and the resolution that stand behind the standard, where each falls in the doctrine of sources. Sections III and IV are the statute — its anatomy, then the way a Recommendation becomes a section. Section V is the evaluation record. Section VI puts the three accounts to that record, and Section VII draws the consequences and asks what a small state can reasonably ask of its assessor.

II. A Standard-Setter without a Treaty

A. The Task Force and its regional body

Guyana's Parliament has defined the standard-setter in its own interpretation section. The amendment of 2022 inserted into section 2(1) of the principal Act the definition: "'Financial Action Task Force' means the task force established by the Group of Seven (G-7) Summit that was

---

[7] José E Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers* (OUP 2005).

[8] Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 106 Yale LJ 2599.

[9] Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Harvard University Press 1995); Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 'On Compliance' (1993) 47 International Organization 175.

held in Paris in 1989, to develop and provide national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing".[10] The definition is accurate, and remarkable. A sovereign legislature has described, in the body of its own statute, an entity created by the communiqué of a summit of seven other states, so that the statute may refer to that entity's "Standards" as a benchmark for the conduct of the country's own Financial Intelligence Unit.[11]

The regional body through which the standard reaches the Caribbean is the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. Its own account of its origins is that representatives of Western Hemisphere countries met in Aruba in May 1990 "to develop a common approach to the phenomenon of the laundering of the proceeds of crime", and that at the Jamaica Ministerial Meeting held in Kingston in November 1992 ministers issued the Kingston Declaration, "in which they endorsed and affirmed their governments' commitment to implement the FATF and CFATF Recommendations, the OAS Model Regulations and the 1988 UN Convention".[12] The Report describes the CFATF as "an inter-governmental body consisting of twenty-four member states and territories of the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America which have agreed to implement common countermeasures".[13] It is, in the FATF's vocabulary, a FATF-style regional body: it evaluates its members against the FATF's Recommendations, using the FATF's Methodology, with the FATF Secretariat among the reviewers of the draft report.[14]

Two features of this arrangement matter. One is that the instrument at the top of the chain — the Recommendations — is not a treaty and was not adopted by any body in which Guyana sits. The Kingston Declaration is a ministerial commitment to implement it; the CFATF is a body of which Guyana is a member; but the Recommendations themselves, revised in 2012 and updated since, are the FATF's.[15] The other is that the evaluation is conducted in two registers. The Report explains that it "analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of the AML/CFT system", that it "was based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations and was prepared using the 2013 Methodology", and that technical compliance is rated compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant or non-compliant, while effectiveness is rated across eleven "Immediate Outcomes" as high, substantial, moderate or low.[16] The first asks whether the law says what the criterion requires; the second whether the system does what the outcome describes.

---

[10] Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2022 (Guyana), Act No 12 of 2022, s 2 (hereafter 'AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2022'), inserting the definition into s 2(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (Guyana), Act No 13 of 2009 (hereafter 'AML/CFT Act 2009').

[11] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2022, s 3 (substituting s 9(4)(l) and (m) of the principal Act: feedback and disclosure "having regard to Egmont Principles, Financial Action Task Force Standards and other international best practices"); s 4 (substituting s 14(1): agreements with foreign units "consistent with the Egmont Principles and other international best practices, including the Financial Action Task Force Standards").

[12] CFATF, 'About us' <https://cfatf-gafic.org/about-us/> accessed 4 September 2026.

[13] MER 2 (front matter). The CFATF's website, read on 4 September 2026, lists twenty-five members; the difference from the Report's figure is not material here.

[14] MER, Preface ("The report was reviewed by ... the FATF Secretariat").

[15] FATF, *International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations* (FATF 2012, as updated); MER, Preface.

[16] MER, Preface; notes to Table 1 and Table 2.

B. The conventions and the resolution

Behind the Recommendations stand four instruments that are law in the ordinary sense, and Guyana is bound by each of them. The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted at Vienna on 20 December 1988, requires each party to criminalise the conversion, transfer, concealment, acquisition, possession or use of property known to be derived from drug offences; Guyana signed it on the day of its adoption and became a party on 19 March 1993.[17] The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted at New York on 15 November 2000, repeats the offence in general terms and requires each party to "seek to apply" it "to the widest range of predicate offences"; Guyana acceded on 14 September 2004.[18] The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted on 9 December 1999, defines the financing offence as the wilful provision or collection of funds to be used for an act within the scope of the treaties listed in its annex, or for any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to civilians in order to intimidate a population or compel a government; Guyana acceded on 12 September 2007.[19] And Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII on 28 September 2001, decided that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, criminalise the wilful provision or collection of funds for that purpose, "freeze without delay" the funds of persons who commit or facilitate terrorist acts, and prohibit their nationals from making funds available to such persons.[20]

Under the Charter, members agree to accept and carry out the Council's decisions, and their Charter obligations prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement.[21]

Guyana's statute incorporates these instruments almost by name. The definition of "terrorist act" in section 2(1) lists nine of the treaties in the annex to the Financing Convention, and the terrorist-financing offence in section 68(1)(a) is defined by reference to "the treaties listed in the appendix to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism to which Guyana is a party".[22] The freezing provisions inserted in 2015 and 2016 name Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1373 and "their successor resolutions" in the body of the section.[23] The Report, assessing the money-laundering offence, records that the third-round deficiency had been that the offences "were not consistent with the requirements of the Vienna and the Palermo

[17] United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 20 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990) 1582 UNTS 95, art 3(1)(b)–(c); United Nations Treaty Collection, ch VI.19 (status as at 4 September 2026: Guyana, signature 20 December 1988; party 19 March 1993).

[18] United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209, art 6(1) and (2)(a); United Nations Treaty Collection, ch XVIII.12 (Guyana, accession 14 September 2004).

[19] International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197, art 2(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, ch XVIII.11 (Guyana, accession 12 September 2007).

[20] UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373, para 1(a)–(d) (adopted at the Council's 4385th meeting).

[21] Charter of the United Nations, arts 25 and 103.

[22] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 2(1) (definition of "terrorist act"), s 68(1)(a).

[23] Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2015 (Guyana), Act No 10 of 2015, s 4(a) (hereafter 'AML/CFT (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2015'); Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2016 (Guyana), Act No 15 of 2016, s 9 (hereafter 'AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2016').

Convention", and that the deficiency was cured by the amendment of 2015.[24]

C. Where the standard falls in the doctrine of sources

Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice directs the Court to apply international conventions establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states, international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, and, subject to Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists as subsidiary means.[25] The four instruments just described fit the first head: each binds Guyana because Guyana consented to it or, in the case of the resolution, to the Charter that gives the Council its power.

The Recommendations fit none of the heads. They are not a convention; no state has ratified them. They are not custom, because the practice they describe is not accompanied by a belief that it is required by law — it is accompanied by a belief that it is required by the assessor. They are not general principles. They are, in Alvarez's account, an instance of the standard-setting that international bodies perform through technical committees, one entry in a long list that runs from food standards to the conditionality of the international financial institutions, none of which is binding by its own terms and all of which determine, in practice, what states do.[26] Alvarez calls this "soft" law, and for most bodies on his list the description holds: a state that departs from the standard does so at a cost it can calculate and, often, absorb.

For Guyana the softness is gone. The mechanism is not mysterious. When the FATF identifies a jurisdiction as having strategic deficiencies, the financial regulators of the jurisdictions whose banks provide correspondent accounts instruct their institutions to take account of the identification. The United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network did so in respect of Guyana twice in 2016, reminding "covered financial institutions" of their due-diligence obligations in respect of "correspondent accounts maintained for foreign financial institutions" in the jurisdictions named, of which Guyana was one.[27] A bank that loses its correspondent relationship cannot clear United States dollars; a country whose banks cannot do so cannot import, export or remit. The Report records, without comment, that every bank in Guyana maintains a specialised unit that can block wire transfers "if there are concerns around the correspondent banking relationship".[28] The obligation to implement the Recommendations is not, in any sense a finance ministry would recognise, optional. It is not, in any sense Article 38 would recognise, law.

A standard that binds no one must nonetheless be given the force of law in a state that had no vote in its making, and the only instrument to hand is the legislative power of article 65. The Act of 2009 is what that instrument produced.

---

[24] MER, Annex A, Recommendation 3 (introductory paragraphs).

[25] Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(a)–(d); see also art 59.

[26] Alvarez (n 7), Part I, on standard-setting by the political and technical organs of international organisations and its effect on the traditional sources of international law.

[27] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (United States Department of the Treasury), Advisory FIN-2016-A004, 'Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies' (7 September 2016) (listing Guyana among the jurisdictions in the FATF's "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process" document as updated on 24 June 2016); Advisory FIN-2016-A001 (2016) (the same list, following an earlier FATF update in 2016).

[28] MER para 332.

III. The Anatomy of the Statute

A. The principal Act of 2009

The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 was passed by the National Assembly on 30 April 2009, as Bill No 18 of 2007, and published in the Official Gazette on 14 August 2009 as Act No 13 of 2009.[29] It comes into operation on such date as the Minister may by order appoint, and it repealed the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 2000.[30] Its long title promises a Financial Intelligence Unit; the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of the unlawful proceeds of all serious offences; powers for the prosecution of money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes; preventive measures by reporting entities; and civil forfeiture.[31] The Act has eight Parts, one hundred and sixteen sections and four Schedules. The Report reproduces its long title, verbatim, as the first entry in its table of Guyana's legislative framework.[32]

The offence is in section 3. A person commits money laundering if, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property represents any person's proceeds of crime, he converts or transfers it with the aim of concealing its illicit origin; conceals or disguises its true nature, origin, location, disposition, movement or ownership; acquires, possesses or uses it; or participates in, conspires to commit, attempts, aids, abets, counsels, procures or facilitates any of those acts.[33] Four sub-sections then remove the obstacles a common-law prosecutor would otherwise meet. It is not necessary to prove which serious offence generated the property; knowledge, intent or purpose may be inferred from objective factual circumstances; no person need have been convicted of the predicate offence; and the launderer may be the person who committed it.[34] The penalty, on summary conviction, was a fine of between one million and one hundred million dollars and imprisonment for seven years; a body corporate was liable to a fine of between two hundred million and five hundred million dollars.[35]

The reach of the offence is fixed by two definitions and one Schedule. "Proceeds of crime" means property derived directly or indirectly from a "serious offence", including property into which it was converted or intermingled.[36] A "serious offence" is any offence against a law of Guyana punishable by death, life imprisonment or deprivation of liberty of not less than six months; any offence listed in the Second Schedule; or conduct abroad that would have been such an offence

[29] AML/CFT Act 2009, Official Gazette (Legal Supplement A) 14 August 2009; the note of passage at the foot of the Act reads "Passed by the National Assembly on 30th April, 2009. (Bill No. 18 of 2007)".

[30] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 1 (commencement) and s 115 (repealing the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 2000, Act No 1 of 2000).

[31] AML/CFT Act 2009, long title.

[32] MER para 48, Table 1.1.

[33] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 3(1)(a)–(d).

[34] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 3(2)–(5).

[35] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 3(6), as enacted. The minimum fine was raised to five million dollars by Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2015 (Guyana), Act No 1 of 2015, s 3(c) (hereafter 'AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015'), and the penalty structure was rewritten by Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Finance of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2017 (Guyana), Act No 21 of 2017, s 2, as described in MER, Annex A, criteria 3.9–3.10.

[36] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 2(1) (definition of "proceeds of crime").

here.[37] The Second Schedule lists nineteen categories, beginning with "participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering" and "terrorism, including terrorist financing" and ending with "insider trading and market manipulation".[38] The Report finds that the Schedule "incorporates all the FATF designated categories of offences".[39] It does; the list is the standard's list.

Part III builds the preventive machinery. Section 9 establishes the Financial Intelligence Unit — in the 2009 text, "by the Minister responsible for Finance" — as the agency for "requesting, receiving, analyzing and dissemination of suspicious transaction reports", with functions lettered (a) to (k) that include guidelines, training and investigations "for official purposes only".[40] The Unit itself is older than the Act: its 2024 Annual Report marks the twentieth anniversary of its establishment.[41] The Act re-founded it. Section 15 prohibits anonymous accounts and requires every reporting entity to establish and verify the identity of its customers at the opening of a relationship, above a prescribed threshold, on suspicion, or on doubt about earlier data; for a legal entity it must "adequately identify the beneficial owner"; for a politically exposed person senior management must approve the relationship and the source of wealth must be established.[42] Section 18 requires "special attention" to complex, unusual or purposeless transactions and a report to the Unit, on suspicion, "as soon as possible but not later than three days after forming that suspicion"; the Unit may then halt the transaction for up to five days.[43]

A "reporting entity" is any person whose business is an activity listed in the First Schedule, or any other activity the Minister of Finance defines by order amending that Schedule.[44] The First Schedule defines "financial institution" by fourteen lettered activities, from the acceptance of deposits to currency changing and anything else the Minister prescribes, and then lists the "designated non-financial businesses or professions": casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, attorneys-at-law, notaries and accountants when they carry out specified transactions for clients, and trust and company service providers.[45] The Fourth Schedule maps each activity to a "supervisory authority": the Governor of the Bank of Guyana, the Commissioner of Insurance and the Guyana Securities Council for the financial sector and, for almost every other line in the table, a "supervisory authority appointed by the Minister responsible for Finance".[46] Section 22 charges each supervisory authority with supervising compliance with sections 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20, and among its functions is to "develop standards and criteria applicable to the communication of suspicious activities that reflect other existing and future pertinent national and internationally accepted standards".[47] Section 23 gives the

[37] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 2(1) (definition of "serious offence").
[38] AML/CFT Act 2009, Second Schedule.
[39] MER, Annex A, criterion 3.2.
[40] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 9(1), (4)(e)(iv), (4)(g) and (4)(i).
[41] Financial Intelligence Unit (Guyana), *Annual Report 2024* (FIU Guyana 2025) 9 ("commemorating its 20th anniversary since establishment") (hereafter 'FIU Annual Report 2024').
[42] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 15(1)–(4).
[43] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 18(1), (4) and (10).
[44] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 2(1) (definition of "reporting entity").
[45] AML/CFT Act 2009, First Schedule.
[46] AML/CFT Act 2009, Fourth Schedule.
[47] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 22(1)–(2), in particular s 22(2)(d).

supervisor five sanctions, from a written warning to a recommendation that the entity's licence be suspended, restricted or withdrawn.[48] The Minister may amend any Schedule by order, subject to negative resolution of the National Assembly.[49]

Part IV provides for restraining orders on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions and for forfeiture on conviction, with a statutory inference against property acquired within six years of the offence that lawful income cannot explain.[50] Part V creates the terrorist-financing offence in section 68, punishable on indictment by a fine "together with death" where the act resulted in death and otherwise by ten to fifteen years' imprisonment, allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to apply to freeze terrorist property, and provides for its forfeiture.[51] Section 2(2) constructs a domestic listing regime under which the Minister of Finance may, on the Attorney General's recommendation, declare an entity a "specified entity", subject to revocation on application and to review by a judge in chambers.[52]

Part VII is civil forfeiture. The court may make a civil forfeiture order transferring property to a receiver where it is shown to its satisfaction that the property "does constitute, directly or indirectly, proceeds of crime"; the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities; and where an officer states on affidavit that he believes the respondent to be in possession of such property of a value of not less than two million dollars, and the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the belief, the statement "shall be evidence" of the matter.[53] The court must not make the order if satisfied that there would be a serious risk of injustice.[54] Part VIII makes the offences extraditable, overrides secrecy obligations, requires the Director of Public Prosecutions' written consent to any prosecution under the Act, and requires the Unit's annual report to be laid before the National Assembly.[55]

Read whole, the 2009 Act is a competent and comprehensive statute. It is also, in every structural respect, the standard's statute. The offence is Vienna and Palermo; the definitions are the glossary; the First Schedule is the standard's list of financial activities; the Second Schedule is the standard's list of designated offences; the Fourth Schedule is the standard's supervisory architecture, with the supervisors for most of the non-financial sector left to be appointed later. The Act was drafted to be assessed.

B. Eight amending Acts and a ninth statute

Between 2010 and 2023 the Act was amended eight times, and in 2023 a second statute was enacted to supply the supervisor that the Fourth Schedule had promised in 2009. Table 1 sets out

[48] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 23(1)(a)–(e).
[49] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 114(2)–(3).
[50] AML/CFT Act 2009, ss 38(1), 39(1) and 46(1)–(2).
[51] AML/CFT Act 2009, ss 68(1), 71(1) and 74(1).
[52] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 2(2), paragraphs (1)–(7).
[53] AML/CFT Act 2009, ss 82(1)–(2) and 86(1)–(2).
[54] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 82(8).
[55] AML/CFT Act 2009, ss 108, 110, 111 and 113.

the sequence, with the Gazette or commencement date of each Act, its principal changes, and the evaluation context in which it was passed.[56]

Act	Gazette (passage)	Principal changes	Evaluation context
No 15 of 2010	In operation 9 August 2010	s 15(10): period for verifying a customer's identity extendable by ministerial order, up to twenty-four months	First year of the third-round follow-up (third-round report July 2011)
No 1 of 2015	10 July 2015	Definitions (beneficial ownership at twenty-five per cent; originator information; shell bank; terrorist financing "whether from a legitimate or an illegitimate source"); s 3(1)(cA) assisting an offender to evade consequences; an Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Authority appointed by the National Assembly (ss 7A–7C, 9A–9G); Director and Deputy Director of the FIU appointed by the National Assembly (s 8); enhanced due diligence and counter-measures (s 16(6)–(7)); supervisory powers of entry (s 22(2)(bA)); seizure of cash anywhere in Guyana (s 37A); targeted financial sanctions (ss 68A–68C); "Tax evasion" added to the Second Schedule	FATF identification of Guyana as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies (October 2014 to October 2016)

[56] Table 1 is compiled from the texts of the Acts: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2010 (Guyana), Act No 15 of 2010, ss 1–2 (in operation 9 August 2010) (hereafter 'AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2010'); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015 (Official Gazette 10 July 2015), ss 2–25; AML/CFT (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2015 (Official Gazette 6 January 2016; passed 17 December 2015), ss 2–8; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2016 (Official Gazette 9 May 2016; passed 4 May 2016), ss 2–11; Act No 21 of 2017 (Official Gazette 22 August 2017), s 2; Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2018 (Guyana), Act No 17 of 2018 (Official Gazette 7 September 2018), ss 2–14 (hereafter 'AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2018'); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2022 (Official Gazette 11 August 2022; passed 8 August 2022), ss 2–4; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, ss 2–48; Compliance Commission Act 2023, ss 3–4, 72 and Schedules. The evaluation context is taken from MER paras 5 and 44 and the Preface, and, for the FATF listing, from the sources at n 84.

Act	Gazette (passage)	Principal changes	Evaluation context
No 10 of 2015	6 January 2016 (passed 17 December 2015)	Beneficial ownership redefined to include "ultimate effective control"; s 68A: the DPP's application within five days rather than seven, ex parte, and the court "shall immediately" grant the freezing order; "Smuggling, including gold smuggling" in the Second Schedule; fit-and-proper tests in the Securities Industry, Co-operative Societies and Insurance Acts	Same
No 15 of 2016	9 May 2016 (passed 4 May 2016)	"may" replaced by "shall" in the designation provisions; wire-transfer penalties (s 20); supervisors to require policies based on the legislation and, for foreign branches, on "the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations" (s 22(2)); fines raised (s 23); resolutions 1373 and 1267 named in s 68A; access to frozen funds (s 68D); beneficial-ownership duties in the Companies Act	Same; removal from FATF monitoring October 2016 and exit from the CFATF's own follow-up November 2016
No 21 of 2017	22 August 2017	s 3: separate summary and indictable penalty tiers for natural persons and bodies corporate	Between the eleventh follow-up report and the fourth round
No 17 of 2018	7 September 2018	The Authority replaced by a National Co-ordination Committee chaired by the Attorney General (s 7A); ss 9C–9G repealed; "proliferation financing" defined; targeted financial sanctions for resolutions 1718 and 2231 (ss 68E–68I); registration of reporting entities with the FIU (s 19(4)); auditors and Commissioners of Oaths brought within s 18	First national risk assessment (2017); "significant changes" recorded by the Report for 2018
No 12 of 2022	11 August 2022 (passed 8 August 2022)	"Egmont Group", "Egmont Principles" and "Financial Action Task Force" defined; FIU information-sharing and foreign agreements reframed around the Egmont Principles and "Financial Action Task Force Standards" (ss 9(4), 14(1))	Egmont membership application (approved February 2024); fourth-round preparation
No 15 of 2023	16 August 2023	Forty-eight sections: "without delay" ("within a matter of hours") and "prompt" (not later than twenty-four hours) defined; virtual, digital and	Fourth-round on-site visit, 4–15 September 2023

C. Reading the waves

The table shows two things. The clustering is one. Five of the nine statutes fall into two windows: July 2015 to May 2016, and August 2023. The first window is the period during which Guyana was identified by the FATF as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies — a period the Report's Preface describes, from the regional side, in terms of the "expedited follow-up" into which Guyana was placed after the third round and the "Eleventh Follow-up report" of 2016 that closed it.[57] The second window is the three weeks before the fourth-round on-site visit. The other four are singletons, explicable in the same terms. The 2010 Act adjusted a verification deadline in the first year of the third-round follow-up. The 2017 Act rewrote the penalty structure of the offence, which the fourth-round criteria assess for proportionality and dissuasiveness. The 2018 Act reorganised the co-ordinating institution and added proliferation financing, which had entered the standard's targeted-sanctions Recommendations. The 2022 Act rewrote the Unit's information-sharing powers around the principles of the Egmont Group, which admitted Guyana in February 2024 after what the Unit describes as "a lengthy process that spanned a period of over 10 years".[58]

The vocabulary is the other. The amending Acts name the standard-setter in their own text with increasing directness. The 2015 Act requires the Unit to direct counter-measures against any country that "does not apply or insufficiently applies the recommendations in accordance with international best practices"; the 2016 Act writes "the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations" into the supervisor's mandate; the 2022 Act defines the Task Force; the 2023 Acts adopt its glossary terms as statutory definitions and instruct the new Commission to be "guided by Recommendation 8 of the Financial Action Task Force standards".[59] Over fourteen years the statute has learned to say, in its own words, where it comes from.

IV. From the Drafter's Chair

A. The instruction

A drafting instruction in this field rarely arrives as a policy paper. It arrives as a table. In the left-hand column is a criterion number; in the middle, the deficiency the assessor or the follow-up process has identified against that criterion; on the right, the action required. The table is generated by the evaluation, or by the anticipation of one, and its rows are the Methodology's criteria. The drafter's brief is therefore the criterion, and the Methodology is open on the desk beside the principal Act.

The criteria are written in a particular grammar. They say what "countries should" do, at a level of detail that leaves the drafter little to invent. The Report's assessment of Recommendation 3 shows the grammar at work. Under criterion 3.1 it records that "Guyana has criminalized ML pursuant to section 3(1) of the AML/CFT Act of 2009 (as amended by Act No. 1 of 2015)" and that

[57] MER, Preface.

[58] FIU Annual Report 2024, 9 and 33 (membership of the Egmont Group approved at its February 2024 plenary in Malta).

[59] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, s 10 (inserting s 16(7)); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2016, s 6(2)(a); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2022, s 2; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 2(a)(i); Compliance Commission Act 2023, Second Schedule, para 2.

"the amendment inserted sec.3(1)(cA) which criminalized assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions".[60] Under criteria 3.2, 3.5, 3.8 and 3.11 it records, in turn, that the Second Schedule "incorporates all the FATF designated categories of offences", that a predicate conviction is unnecessary, that intent "may be inferred from objective factual circumstances", and that the 2015 amendment "also makes it an offence to assist any person involved in a ML offence to evade the legal consequences".[61] Each criterion is answered by a sub-section; each sub-section exists because of the criterion. The assessor's reading of the section against the criterion is the drafter's reading in reverse. The sub-section inserted in 2015 as paragraph (cA) is the Vienna Convention's phrase "assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions", repeated in the Palermo Convention, and carried into the statute because a criterion required it and the third round had noted its absence.[62]

B. The vocabulary

Once the criterion is the brief, the standard's words become the statute's words, because any other words would have to be defended to the assessor as equivalent. The 2023 Act is the clearest illustration. It defines "without delay" to mean "within a matter of hours", and "prompt" to mean "as soon as reasonably practicable under the facts and circumstances at the time but no later than twenty-four hours"; it defines "digital assets" as "digital representations of fiat currencies, securities and other financial assets as determined by the Financial Action Task Force but does not include virtual assets or crypto-assets".[63] The first two definitions exist because the targeted-sanctions Recommendations and resolution 1373 use the phrase "without delay". I read the third as a delegation: the content of a statutory term is handed to a body that is not a Guyanese institution, and whose determinations the Guyanese Gazette does not publish. The Report, assessing the same amendments, found that "the processes and procedures for the implementation of an asset freeze ... entail various steps that do not allow for the implementation of same without delay", and that nothing in the Act "establishes that the asset freeze and prohibitions are implemented within a matter of hours".[64] The definition had been enacted; the mechanism had not. That is the pattern in miniature.

The vocabulary reaches into the institutional provisions as well. The 2009 Act already required supervisors to develop standards "that reflect other existing and future pertinent national and internationally accepted standards".[65] The 2015 Act added a duty on supervisors to require branches and subsidiaries abroad to apply "the higher standard" where the host country's requirements are "less strict", and the 2016 Act attached to that duty the words "and the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations".[66] The 2023 Act empowers the Minister of

[60] MER, Annex A, criterion 3.1.

[61] MER, Annex A, criteria 3.2, 3.5, 3.8 and 3.11.

[62] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, s 3(b); United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (n 17) art 3(1)(b)(i); United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (n 18) art 6(1)(a)(i); MER, Annex A, Recommendation 3 (introductory paragraphs).

[63] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 2(a)(i) (definitions of "without delay", "prompt" and "digital assets").

[64] MER, Annex Table 2 (Summary of Technical Compliance — Key Deficiencies), Recommendations 6 and 7.

[65] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 22(2)(d).

[66] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, s 14(c) (inserting s 22(2)(eA)); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2016, s 6(2)(a).

Finance to issue a directive to any person carrying on business in or from Guyana where "the Financial Action Task Force or the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, has advised that measures should be taken in relation to a country".[67] The Compliance Commission Act instructs the Commission to be "guided by Recommendation 8".[68] These are not incorporations by reference of a treaty. They are incorporations by reference of a document that the Guyanese legislature cannot amend and that the standard-setter revises on its own timetable.

C. The schedule and the alphabet

A Recommendation that lists things becomes a Schedule that lists the same things. The Second Schedule of 2009 is the standard's designated categories of offences; when "Tax evasion" was added in 2015, "Smuggling" expanded to include gold smuggling in the same year, and "Proliferation Financing" added in 2023, the Schedule was being kept current with the standard's list rather than with any change in Guyanese criminal law.[69] The First Schedule's fourteen financial activities are the standard's definition of a financial institution rendered as a list, and the 2023 Act extended it to auto dealers, money lenders, payment-service providers and virtual-asset service providers as those categories entered the standard.[70] The Fourth Schedule shows the method's limits. In 2009 it allocated attorneys-at-law, accountants, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones and trust and company service providers to "a supervisory authority appointed by the Minister responsible for Finance". For the legal and accounting professions that appointment was never made. The Report records that for the period under review "there was no supervision of some DNFBP sectors (attorneys-at-law, notaries, accountants and non-financial TCSPs)", and that supervision of those sectors "was at a nascent stage with the recent designation of the Guyana Compliance Commission".[71] The obligation was written in 2009; the supervisor was written in 2023; and on the day the assessors left, the supervisor did not yet exist.[72]

The amending Acts leave a further trace. Because each amendment answers a criterion, and because the criteria arrive in the standard's order rather than the statute's, the new provisions are inserted between existing sections as lettered sections: 7A to 7G, 9A to 9G, 22A and 22B, 37A to 37C, 45A, 57A and 57B, 60A to 60D, 66A to 66E, 68A to 68I, 75A to 75E, 109A, 110A and 112A.[73] The alphabet of the amending Acts is the fossil record of the criteria. I would expect a statute drafted from a domestic theory of the harm to have been consolidated at some point in fourteen years. A statute drafted to a rubric is extended instead, letter by letter, in the places where the rubric found it wanting.

[67] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 39 (inserting s 75E(1)(a)).

[68] Compliance Commission Act 2023, Second Schedule, para 2.

[69] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, s 23; AML/CFT (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2015, s 7; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 45.

[70] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 44.

[71] MER, Key Findings (f) and para 18.

[72] MER para 59 ("Neither the Commission nor the Authority were established by the end of the onsite visit"); Annex A, criterion 28.3.

[73] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, ss 4, 7, 17 and 18; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2018, ss 6 and 13; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, ss 9, 11, 17, 22, 26, 28, 30, 39, 42 and 43 (arrangement of sections).

D. The institution, twice

The most revealing episode concerns the institution at the top of the domestic architecture, because it changed twice within one evaluation cycle. The 2015 Act created an Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Authority of ten members, appointed by the National Assembly "by a simple majority" on the recommendation of the Parliamentary Committee on Appointments; the Authority was to give the Unit "advice of a general nature as to the policy to be followed", to ensure that its performance "accords with our international obligations and commitments", and to "ascertain the need for any new legislation".[74] The same Act transferred the appointment of the Director and Deputy Director of the Unit to the National Assembly, and deleted from section 9(1) the words "by the Minister responsible for Finance", so that the Unit was thereafter "established" by the statute itself.[75] Three years later the 2018 Act replaced the Authority with a National Co-ordination Committee chaired by the Attorney General and composed of the heads of the competent authorities, and repealed the Authority's financial provisions.[76] The Committee's functions include developing national policies "informed by the risks identified", co-ordinating "Guyana's participation in the international effort", and determining "the need for any new legislation or amendments to existing legislation".[77]

Two constitutional designs for the same function, three years apart, one parliamentary and one executive; and the Report assesses only the second, under criterion 1.2, as the mechanism by which Guyana "assigned ... the responsibility for inter alia developing the national AML/CFT/CPF policies informed by the risks identified".[78] The domestic argument about where the institution should sit — an argument about the separation of powers in a small state — is invisible to the assessment, because the criterion asks only whether a co-ordinating mechanism exists. The National Policy and Strategy Plan the Committee now administers states its own fundamental objective as being "to ensure that Guyana achieves a high level of compliance with the FATF Standards".[79] The domestic institution's purpose, in its own words, is compliance.

E. The deadline

The calendar is the assessor's. The Report records that "Guyana made significant amendments to its TFS-TF legislative framework in August 2023 pursuant to the AML/CFT (Amendment) Act No. 15 of 2023", lists the additions — "the requirement to act 'without delay' in various provisions", prompt determinations on foreign designation requests, "additional provisions on asset freezing" — and notes elsewhere that the two supervisory bodies the August statutes created "were not yet constituted" by the end of the on-site visit.[80] The Gazette date is 16 August; the on-site began on 4 September. The 2015 and 2016 Acts show the same relationship to the FATF's

[74] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, s 4 (inserting ss 7A(1)–(2) and 7B(1), (4)(b) and (4)(d)).
[75] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2015, s 5 (substituting s 8) and s 6(1) (amending s 9(1)).
[76] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2018, s 3 (substituting s 7A(1)–(2)) and s 9 (repealing ss 9C–9G).
[77] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2018, s 3 (s 7A(6)(a), (c) and (h)).
[78] MER, Annex A, criterion 1.2.
[79] MER para 46; see also para 47 (the Committee "is mandated to monitor progress and achievement of initiatives").
[80] MER para 248; para 44; para 59.

own calendar: the second 2015 Act was passed on 17 December 2015 and gazetted on 6 January 2016; the 2016 Act was passed on 4 May 2016; in June 2016 the FATF's updated list, as reproduced by the United States Treasury, still carried Guyana's name; in October 2016 it did not.[81] The legislature met the deadline. The deadline was not its own.

V. The Evaluation Record

A. The third round and the listing

Guyana's third-round evaluation was conducted in 2010 under the 2004 Methodology, and the report was dated July 2011. The Report of 2024 summarises the outcome: compliant with one Recommendation, largely compliant with five, partially compliant with fifteen and non-compliant with nineteen; all sixteen Core and Key Recommendations rated partially or non-compliant; and Guyana "placed in expedited follow-up".[82] The Preface records that "in 2016, Guyana presented the Eleventh Follow-up report in which all the deficiencies identified in the Core and Key Recommendations, initially rated as PC/NC, were addressed", that Guyana had reached "a level of compliance comparable to at least LC", and that its exit from the CFATF's own review process "was successfully approved by the CFATF Plenary in Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands in November 2016".[83] In the same period the FATF, through its International Co-operation Review Group, identified Guyana in its public document of October 2014 as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies that had developed an action plan, and removed it from that document in October 2016.[84] The statutory provisions of 2015 and 2016 catalogued in Table 1 are the domestic record of that listing.

B. The fourth round

The fourth-round on-site visit took place from 4 to 15 September 2023. The Report was adopted at the CFATF Plenary in Port of Spain in 2024 — the Report's own front matter dates the Plenary to May 2024, while the Ministry of Legal Affairs' account dates the 58th Plenary at which the draft was adopted to 2–7 June 2024 — and was published in July 2024.[85] Its ratings are

81 AML/CFT (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2015 (passed 17 December 2015; Official Gazette 6 January 2016); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2016 (passed 4 May 2016); FinCEN Advisory FIN-2016-A004 (n 27) (Guyana listed following the FATF update of 24 June 2016); for the October 2016 removal, see n 84.

82 MER, Preface; para 5 ("the 3rd Round assessment in 2010 (Report dated July 2011)").

83 MER, Preface.

84 FATF, 'Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process' (24 October 2014) and FATF, 'Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process' (21 October 2016) (FATF public documents; the FATF's website could not be read directly when this paper was prepared, and the dates are taken from the FATF's country page for Guyana and the CFATF Public Statement of November 2016 as reported in secondary summaries) [VERIFY: confirm both dates against the FATF documents before print]. The FinCEN advisories at n 27 confirm that Guyana remained on the FATF's list in the first half of 2016.

85 MER para 1 and Preface (on-site visit 4–15 September 2023); MER 2 ("This report was adopted by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) at its May, 2024 Plenary held in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago"); cover dated July 2024. Ministry of Legal Affairs (Guyana), 'Guyana defends favourable ratings at CFATF Plenary' (9 June 2024) <https://mola.gov.gy/post/guyana-defends-favourable-ratings-at-cfatf-plenary> accessed 4 September 2026, states that the report "was adopted at the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) 58th Plenary and Working Group Meetings held from June 2, to June 7, in Port of Spain". The discrepancy in the month is the sources', not the author's; the Report's own front matter is followed in the text.

reproduced in Tables 2 and 3.[86]

Table 2. Technical compliance ratings, fourth-round Mutual Evaluation Report (2024)

Recommendation	**Rating**	**Recommendation**	**Rating**
R.1	LC	R.21	C
R.2	C	R.22	LC
R.3	C	R.23	LC
R.4	C	R.24	PC
R.5	C	R.25	PC
R.6	LC	R.26	LC
R.7	PC	R.27	LC
R.8	PC	R.28	LC
R.9	LC	R.29	C
R.10	LC	R.30	C
R.11	LC	R.31	LC
R.12	C	R.32	C
R.13	LC	R.33	C
R.14	C	R.34	C
R.15	PC	R.35	LC
R.16	LC	R.36	LC
R.17	C	R.37	LC
R.18	LC	R.38	C
R.19	C	R.39	C
R.20	C	R.40	C

Table 3. Effectiveness ratings, fourth-round Mutual Evaluation Report (2024)

Immediate Outcome	**Subject**	**Rating**
IO.1	Risk, policy and coordination	Substantial
IO.2	International cooperation	Moderate
IO.3	Supervision	Moderate
IO.4	Preventive measures	Moderate
IO.5	Legal persons and arrangements	Moderate
IO.6	Financial intelligence	Substantial
IO.7	Money laundering investigation and prosecution	Moderate
IO.8	Confiscation	Moderate
IO.9	Terrorist financing investigation and prosecution	Moderate

[86] MER, Table 1 and Table 2. The subject headings in Table 3 follow the Report's table of contents.

Immediate Outcome	Subject	Rating
IO.10	Terrorist financing preventive measures and financial sanctions	Moderate
IO.11	Proliferation financing financial sanctions	Moderate

Eighteen Recommendations are rated compliant and seventeen largely compliant; five — new technologies, proliferation sanctions, non-profit organisations and the transparency of legal persons and arrangements — are partially compliant; none is non-compliant. Nine of the eleven Immediate Outcomes are rated moderate and two substantial; none is high and none is low. The Report's own summary is that "Guyana has good results on technical compliance with the FATF Standards", that "the country made significant changes to its AML/CFT legislative regime in 2018, 2022 and in 2023", and that it "made changes and implemented efforts to improve effectiveness of its AML/CFT system subsequent to the AML/CFT legislative restructuring".[87] The order of the clauses is exact: the legislation came first, and the effectiveness was to follow.

C. The findings

Three findings carry the weight of the argument. The first is stated in the Executive Summary and repeated in the body: "Guyana has had no convictions for ML in the jurisdiction"; "there have been no convictions for ML in the jurisdiction, therefore the AT was unable to make a determination on the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions"; and "ML matters are not prioritised in the judicial process".[88] Between 2018 and 2022 the Special Organised Crime Unit received eighty intelligence reports from the Unit, completed sixty-eight investigations, charged six persons and laid two hundred and seventy-three charges, of which two hundred and seventy were laid indictably; "only natural persons have been prosecuted for ML and these cases are still before the Magistrates' court, even for cases which were charged indictably".[89] At the time of the on-site visit Guyana had twenty magistrates and eleven judges; between 2018 and 2023 the judiciary's training on money laundering was "limited", the latest session having been attended by one judge and one magistrate; and "delays in the judicial system due to factors such as a backlog of cases has contributed to the delay [of] ML matters".[90] The Report also records that "Guyana has no confiscations recorded for ML".[91]

The second is the civil route. The Report finds that Guyana "has demonstrated the use of non-conviction-based forfeiture in the instance when an ML conviction could not be obtained", gives as its example a case in which a criminal charge was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence and a civil forfeiture order was then obtained in the High Court over the detained currency, and records that of thirteen matters referred by the Customs Anti-Narcotic Unit for parallel investigation, civil forfeiture orders were obtained in four and six were returned "due to lack of evidence to pursue ML charges".[92] The assessors' conclusion was that "alternative measures were

[87] MER para 5.
[88] MER para 10; Chapter 3, Key Findings, Immediate Outcome 7, (d).
[89] MER para 174 and Table 3.9; para 189; para 188.
[90] MER para 190.
[91] MER para 11; Chapter 3, Key Findings, Immediate Outcome 8, (d).
[92] MER, Chapter 3, Key Findings, Immediate Outcome 7, (e); Box 3.8; para 175.

not consistently pursued where ML convictions could not be secured".[93] The same is true of terrorist financing: "Guyana has had no convictions for TF during the period under review", with "limited TF investigations with no prosecutions or convictions".[94]

The third finding is institutional. The supervisor for the legal and accounting professions had been created by statute in August 2023 and "was not constituted by the end of the on-site"; the Real Estate Agents Authority likewise; beneficial-ownership filings had risen from 145 companies in the second half of 2020 to 1,977 in the first nine months of 2023, but "the BO information available is not accurate and current for the majority of registered companies"; and the targeted-sanctions mechanism, despite the August 2023 definitions, suffered "delays implementing TFS due to reliance on manual checks and the lack of formal and direct receipt of the Lists from the UNSC".[95] The Report's priority actions ask Guyana to "prioritise ML investigations", to "ensure that LEAs are consistently pursuing confiscation in all matters", to train the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the judiciary, and, "upon institution of the GCC and the Real Estate Authority", to implement risk-based supervision of the professions.[96]

D. The courts, since

One development since the Report goes to the design of the statute rather than its administration. In May 2026 the Court of Appeal of Guyana refused a gold dealer and his company leave to appeal against a Full Court decision that the Special Organised Crime Unit, an unincorporated unit within the Police Force, has standing to bring proceedings under the Act for the detention and forfeiture of property; the High Court had earlier held that the Unit lacked legal personality to do so, and the Full Court had reversed that decision on the footing that the 2022 and 2023 amendments, which name the Unit as a "relevant Competent Authority" and describe its functions in section 109A, necessarily conferred the standing the functions require.[97] The agency the statute placed at the centre of money-laundering enforcement was created in 2013, named in the Act in 2022 and given a statutory description in 2023 — and seventeen years after the principal Act was passed, the question whether it could sue under the Act was still being decided on appeal.[98] A statute drafted from the domestic institution outward would have answered that question in its first section on the institution. A statute drafted from the criterion inward answered it, eventually, by implication.

---

[93] MER para 194; para 10.

[94] MER para 12; Key Findings (d).

[95] MER para 59; Annex A, criterion 28.3; para 483; para 267.

[96] MER, Priority Actions, (c), (d), (e) and (g).

[97] 'Appeal Court upholds SOCU's power to seize gold, cash in money laundering case' *News Room Guyana* (Georgetown, 11 May 2026); 'Money laundering case: Appeal Court affirms SOCU's legal power to seize gold, cash' *INews Guyana* (Georgetown, 12 May 2026). Both reports name the panel as Barlow, Gregory and Khan JJA and describe the earlier High Court and Full Court rulings; the second records that the applicants' proposed appeal was held to have no "realistic prospect of success" and records the reliance placed on ss 39 and 109A of the Act. The press reports are cited for the event only [VERIFY: neutral citation and official text of the judgment].

[98] MER para 167 (creation of the Special Organised Crime Unit in 2013); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2022, s 2 (definition of "relevant competent authority", which "includes, the Special Organised Crime Unit (SOCU) of the Guyana Police Force"); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, ss 18–19 and 42 (ss 38, 39 and 109A).

VI. Compliance as Legislation

A. Alvarez, and the vote Guyana does not have

Alvarez's contribution was to insist that the doctrine of sources describes where international law is supposed to come from, not where the rules governing states actually come from, and that the second question leads to the organs and secretariats of international institutions.[99] His concern, at the close of the book, is with the legitimacy of law made in that way — with the vertical challenge to consent, and with the prospect that institutional law-making becomes a vehicle for the powerful.[100] The FATF is the sharpest available example, and Guyana is the sharpest available vantage point from which to see it. Guyana has a seat in the CFATF, and its ministers committed themselves at Kingston to implement the Recommendations; but the Recommendations, the Methodology, the Immediate Outcomes and the criteria are made by the FATF, and Guyana has no vote there.[101] Alvarez's accountability deficit is, in this instance, complete: a public power is exercised over a state by a body in which the state has neither voice nor recourse, and the state's only lawful response is to legislate what it is told.

What Alvarez did not describe is what that legislation looks like from the inside. The argument of this paper is that it looks like the statute described in Sections III and IV: a competent domestic enactment whose every structural feature is traceable to a criterion, extended by lettered sections in the order in which the criteria found it wanting, and defined, in its own interpretation clause, by reference to the body that wrote the criteria. That is not soft law influencing hard law. It is soft law being converted into hard law by the only converter available — the legislative power of article 65 — under a compulsion that neither the Constitution nor the doctrine of sources recognises as legal.[102]

B. Koh, and internalisation by deadline

Koh's answer to the question why nations obey is that they come to obey through a transnational legal process — "the interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms into domestic legal structures" — in which repeated interaction generates interpretation, interpretation is internalised into domestic law, and internalised norms are obeyed out of a sense of obligation rather than calculation.[103] The account fits the Guyanese record well at one level and not at all at another. At the level of the text, the FATF standard has been internalised more completely than almost any treaty Guyana has ratified. At the level of the norm, the internalisation is thin, and the Report says so in its own vocabulary: the law is compliant, the outcomes are moderate.

---

[99] Alvarez (n 7), Part I.

[100] Alvarez (n 7), concluding chapter (the legitimacy of institutional law-making and the vertical and horizontal challenges to it).

[101] CFATF, 'About us' (n 12); MER 2; FATF Recommendations (n 15).

[102] Constitution (n 4) art 65(1).

[103] Koh (n 8) (summary and Part III: "interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms into domestic legal structures"; "this repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalization").

The reason, on the argument advanced here, is that two of Koh's three phases have been displaced. The interaction is not among domestic actors persuading one another that the norm is right; it is between a government and an assessor, on a schedule the assessor sets. The interpretation is not performed by domestic courts construing the statute in cases; it is performed by the assessment team applying the criteria to the text, and the domestic courts have had almost no occasion to construe the offence because almost no case has reached them.[104] What remains is internalisation — the third phase — achieved by deadline. Koh's own restatement of the theory identifies the danger: both the managerial and the fairness accounts, he wrote, "fail to describe the pathways whereby a 'managerial' discourse or 'fair' international rule penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of that nation's internal value set".[105] Guyana's statute is the pathway made visible, and it shows that a norm can enter a legal system by the front door of the Gazette without entering its value set.

C. The Chayeses, and the manager who is not a party

The Chayeses' managerial model is the nearest thing in the literature to a description of mutual evaluation. Compliance, on their account, is produced not by coercive enforcement but by a continuous process of reporting, review, justification and assistance within a treaty regime, and the relevant question is not whether compliance is perfect but whether it is at an "acceptable" level defined by the regime's purposes.[106] Mutual evaluation is that process, systematised: report, review, justification at the plenary, and follow-up. The Ministry of Legal Affairs' own description of the 2024 plenary — a "face-to-face interrogative peer review engagement" at which Guyana "successfully withstood scrutiny" — could have been written to illustrate the model.[107]

But the model rests on an assumption the FATF regime does not satisfy. The Chayeses' regime is a treaty regime whose parties negotiated its terms, consented to its review machinery and defined, in principle, the acceptable level of compliance together. In the FATF regime the acceptable level is defined by the manager's rubric, in a document the managed state did not negotiate, and the consequence of falling below it is not the regime's disapproval but the withdrawal of the correspondent relationships on which the state's economy runs.[108] The managerial model explains why Guyana reports, justifies and legislates. It does not explain why the legislation takes the form it does, because it does not ask what a state does when the manager's criteria are the only draft it has been given. That question is answered by the drafting room, not by the theory of compliance.

D. The better view

The better view, respectfully, is that compliance under mutual evaluation is a mode of legislation in its own right, and that it produces a characteristic statutory form. The statute's structure follows the standard's, not the harm's. Its amendments come in waves timed to the evaluation

[104] MER paras 188–190.

[105] Koh (n 8), Introduction; see also Harold Hongju Koh, 'Transnational Legal Process' (1996) 75 Neb L Rev 181.

[106] Chayes and Chayes, 'On Compliance' (n 9) (the level of compliance with international agreements is "inherently unverifiable"; treaties should be judged by an "acceptable" rather than a strict standard of compliance); Chayes and Chayes, *The New Sovereignty* (n 9).

[107] Ministry of Legal Affairs (n 85).

[108] FinCEN Advisories (n 27); MER para 332.

cycle. Its definitions delegate meaning to the standard-setter. Its Schedules are the standard's lists. Its institutions are created on the page before they exist in the world, because the criterion asks whether the institution is designated, not whether it is staffed. And its offence provisions are technically complete before the investigative, prosecutorial and judicial capacity to use them exists, because technical compliance is assessed first and effectiveness only later. None of the three accounts predicts that form, and the reason is the same in each case: they were built for a state that could have said no. A state that did not agree, and cannot refuse, legislates differently. The Constitution places the legislative power in Parliament and makes itself the supreme law; the record shows Parliament exercising that power, repeatedly and competently, to enact an outline drawn elsewhere.[109]

VII. What Follows

A. The enforcement gap as a design consequence

It follows that the enforcement gap the Report records — a compliant offence and no conviction; compliant confiscation powers and no confiscation for money laundering; a compliant financial-intelligence unit rated substantially effective and a prosecution system rated moderate — is not a moral failing of the institutions that administer the Act. It is a consequence of the way the Act was made. An offence drafted to criteria 3.1 to 3.11 is complete when the criteria are met. It is not, at that moment, matched to the evidentiary capacity of a police unit of twenty-five investigators, a prosecution service that does not appear in the magistrates' courts, and a bench of eleven judges with one training session between them.[110] The statute removed the common-law obstacles to proof — the need to identify the predicate, the need for a predicate conviction, the difficulty of proving knowledge — because the criteria required their removal.[111] It did not, and could not, supply the forensic accountants, the case-management system, the disclosure regime and the judicial time that the removal presupposed. The Report's request that Guyana "keep comprehensive statistics on all investigations and prosecutions" is a request for the most basic instrument of a domestic criminology, and the fact that it had to be made in 2024 shows how far the statute ran ahead of the system it was written for.[112]

The civil route is the path the system found. Part VII asks for the balance of probabilities and makes an officer's belief, on reasonable grounds, evidence of the matter believed; the 2023 Act made property recoverable "including times before the commencement date of this Act" and created a National Forfeiture Fund.[113] The Report's examples of success are civil: currency forfeited in the High Court after a criminal charge was dismissed; cash found strapped to a courier at Skeldon and in paint tins on the back-track route, forfeited on application.[114] That is not a distortion of the statute. It is the statute working as drafted, in the one register where the design and the capacity coincide.

---

[109] Constitution (n 4) arts 8 and 65(1).

[110] MER paras 170, 188 and 190; Chapter 3, Key Findings, Immediate Outcome 7, (c) (the Director of Public Prosecutions "does not prosecute at the magistrates' court").

[111] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 3(2)–(4); MER, Annex A, criteria 3.5 and 3.8.

[112] MER, Recommended Actions, Immediate Outcome 7, (f); Priority Actions, (j).

[113] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 86(1)–(2); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 30 (inserting ss 66A(1) and 66B).

[114] MER, Box 3.8; Box 3.9; para 207.

B. Three drafting lessons

Three lessons follow for the drafting chair, and they are offered as lessons about method rather than as criticism of any Act.

Offence design comes first, and evidentiary capacity with it. A drafter answering criterion 3.8 will write that knowledge "may be inferred from objective factual circumstances"; a drafter answering the domestic question will ask who is to prove the circumstances, and how, and will put the procedural provisions — expert evidence, admissibility of financial records, case management — in the same Bill as the offence. The 2023 Act's provision allowing the court to accept the report of a forensic accountant as an expert report is the kind of provision meant. It came fourteen years after the offence.[115]

The second lesson is about supervisors. A Schedule that names a supervisor "appointed by the Minister" satisfies the criterion that a supervisor be designated, and it did so for fourteen years during which no supervisor for the professions was appointed.[116] The domestic lesson is that a supervisory obligation should not be imposed on a sector until the supervisor exists, or that the provision imposing it should be brought into operation by the same order that constitutes the supervisor. The Compliance Commission Act's own transitional provision for virtual assets — a prohibition on licensing until 31 December 2025, with notification and cessation periods running from commencement — shows that the technique is available.[117]

The last is commencement. The principal Act comes into operation on a date the Minister appoints. Where a provision creates a mechanism that requires machinery — a freezing order "within a matter of hours" requires a channel for receipt of the Security Council's lists, a duty officer and a judge available in chambers — the commencement order should follow the machinery, not precede it. The alternative, which the Report documents, is a statute that defines "without delay" and a system that cannot act without delay.[118]

C. What a small state can ask of the assessor

None of this is a case against the standard. Guyana's exposure to drug trafficking, gold smuggling and the laundering of their proceeds is documented in its own national risk assessment, and the preventive architecture the Act built has produced intelligence the Report rates as substantially effective.[119] Three requests can be put to the assessor.

Sequencing is one. A small state should be able to say, in its follow-up reporting, that a provision has been enacted but not commenced because the machinery is being built, and to be credited for the honesty rather than debited for the gap. Credit for capacity is another. The effectiveness ratings measure outcomes; they do not measure the distance travelled by a jurisdiction of eleven judges, and a methodology that rated the distance as well as the outcome would picture such a

[115] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 43 (inserting s 112A).

[116] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 22(1)(d) and Fourth Schedule; MER para 18; Annex A, criterion 28.3.

[117] Compliance Commission Act 2023, s 72(3)–(4); MER para 15 (virtual asset service providers "were prohibited by the end of the on-site").

[118] AML/CFT Act 2009, s 1; AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 2(a)(i); MER para 267 and Annex Table 2, Recommendations 6 and 7.

[119] MER para 2 (the 2021 national risk assessment's estimates of proceeds from drug trafficking and gold smuggling); para 166; Table 1 (Immediate Outcome 6 rated substantial).

state differently. The third is a domestic criminology. The Committee the 2018 Act created has among its statutory functions to "determine the need for any new legislation or amendments to existing legislation", and the 2023 Act added the duty to "regularly review" national policies and to "co-ordinate actions to assess risks".[120] Those functions could be turned outward: a legislative programme derived from the national risk assessment and the statistics the Report asks for, rather than from the next deficiency table, would still satisfy the criteria, and it would be Guyana's. The Unit's own statement of its priorities — the follow-up report due at the CFATF's November 2025 plenary, and a new national risk assessment in 2025 — shows the two calendars side by side.[121] The argument of this paper is that the second should drive the first.

VIII. Conclusion

This paper opened on two Acts gazetted nineteen days before an on-site visit and asked what kind of law they were. They were compliance, in legislative form. The principal Act of 2009 was drafted to be assessed; its eight amendments answered criteria in the order in which evaluations found them wanting; its ninth companion statute supplied, in the third week of August 2023, a supervisor promised in the Fourth Schedule fourteen years earlier. The vocabulary of the statute is the vocabulary of the standard, to the point of defining the standard-setter and delegating the meaning of statutory terms to it. Its institutions changed twice in three years without the change being visible to the criterion that assessed them. Its deadlines were the assessor's.

The evaluation record is the predictable product. A statute that proves itself against a rubric will be rated compliant; a system that has not yet been built will be rated moderate; and an offence drafted to remove the obstacles to proof will produce, until the capacity to prove exists, charges without convictions and forfeitures without trials. Alvarez's account of institutional law-making explains the source of the compulsion but not the form of the response; Koh's explains the internalisation but not its thinness; the Chayeses' explains the process of review but assumes a consent that was never given. The claim advanced here — that compliance is itself a mode of legislation, with a recognisable statutory shape — fills that space, and the sections of Guyana's Act are its evidence.

The claim is not a counsel of despair. The same legislative power that enacted the outline can enact the machinery, and it can be exercised on Guyana's calendar as well as the assessor's. From the drafting chair the point is a plain one. The two calendars are different, and the criterion is where the brief begins, not where it ends. The only statute that finally satisfies the standard it was written to meet is the one that has proved itself in a courtroom, and that is the proof the 2024 Report looked for and did not find.

Table of Cases

Court of Appeal of Guyana

[120] AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2018, s 3 (s 7A(6)(h)); AML/CFT (Amendment) Act 2023, s 3 (amending s 7A(6)(a)–(b)).
[121] FIU Annual Report 2024, 11.

- *De Oliveira Moura and Moura Gago Gold Inc v Special Organised Crime Unit* (Court of Appeal of Guyana, 11 May 2026, Barlow, Gregory and Khan JJA) (refusal of leave to appeal from the Full Court; reported in the press) [VERIFY: neutral citation and an official copy of the written judgment before print]

Table of Legislation and Instruments

Statutes and subsidiary legislation (Guyana)

- Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Cap 1:01, arts 8, 65(1)
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009, Act No 13 of 2009
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2010, Act No 15 of 2010
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2015, Act No 1 of 2015
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2015, Act No 10 of 2015
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2016, Act No 15 of 2016
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Finance of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2017, Act No 21 of 2017
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2018, Act No 17 of 2018
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2022, Act No 12 of 2022
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No 15 of 2023
- Guyana Compliance Commission Act 2023, Act No 14 of 2023
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Regulations 2010, 2015 and (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2023 (as listed in the Mutual Evaluation Report, Table 1.1)
- Anti-Terrorism and Terrorist Related Activities Act 2015 (as listed in the Mutual Evaluation Report, Table 1.1)
- Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023, Act No 13 of 2023 (as described in the Mutual Evaluation Report, para 59)
- Combatting of Trafficking in Persons Act 2023, Act No 7 of 2023 (as amended by Act No 15 of 2023, s 48)
- Companies Act, Cap 89:01, s 470A (as substituted by Act No 15 of 2016, Schedule)
- Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, Cap 15:05 (as amended by Act No 1 of 2015 and Act No 15 of 2016)
- Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 2000, Act No 1 of 2000 (repealed)

Treaties and international instruments

- Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), arts 25, 103
- Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), arts 38(1), 59

- United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 20 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990) 1582 UNTS 95, art 3
- International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197, art 2
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209, art 6
- UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373
- UNSC Res 1267 (1999), 1718 (2006) and 2231 (2015), as referred to in the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009, ss 68A and 68E (as amended)

Other instruments and official documents

- FATF, *International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations* (FATF 2012, as updated)
- FATF, *Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems* (FATF 2013, as updated)
- Kingston Declaration, Jamaica Ministerial Meeting of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Kingston, November 1992
- CFATF, *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures — The Co-operative Republic of Guyana: Mutual Evaluation Report* (CFATF, July 2024)
- Financial Intelligence Unit (Guyana), *Annual Report 2024* (FIU Guyana 2025)
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (United States Department of the Treasury), Advisory FIN-2016-A001, 'Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies' (2016) and Advisory FIN-2016-A004 (7 September 2016)
- National Policy and Strategy Plan for Combating Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing and the Financing of Proliferation 2021–2025 (Guyana), approved by Cabinet 2 March 2023 (as described in the Mutual Evaluation Report, paras 46–47)
- Guyana's Second Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing National Risk Assessment (2021) (as described in the Mutual Evaluation Report, paras 2, 166)

Bibliography

Primary sources

- CFATF, *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures — The Co-operative Republic of Guyana: Mutual Evaluation Report* (CFATF, July 2024)
- CFATF, 'About us' (Caribbean Financial Action Task Force) <https://cfatf-gafic.org/about-us/> accessed 4 September 2026
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Advisory FIN-2016-A001, 'Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies' (2016) and Advisory FIN-2016-A004 (7 September 2016) <https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories> accessed 4 September 2026
- Financial Intelligence Unit (Guyana), *Annual Report 2024* (FIU Guyana 2025)
- Ministry of Legal Affairs (Guyana), 'Guyana defends favourable ratings at CFATF Plenary' (9 June 2024) <https://mola.gov.gy/post/guyana-defends-favourable-ratings-at-cfatf-plenary> accessed 4 September 2026
- Official Gazette of Guyana, Legal Supplement A: 14 August 2009; 10 July 2015; 6 January 2016; 9 May 2016; 22 August 2017; 7 September 2018; 11 August 2022; 16 August 2023

- United Nations Treaty Collection, status pages for the 1988 Vienna Convention (chapter VI.19), the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention (chapter XVIII.11) and the 2000 Transnational Organized Crime Convention (chapter XVIII.12) <https://treaties.un.org> accessed 4 September 2026

Secondary sources

- Alvarez JE, *International Organizations as Law-Makers* (OUP 2005)
- Chayes A and Chayes AH, 'On Compliance' (1993) 47 International Organization 175
- Chayes A and Chayes AH, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Harvard University Press 1995)
- Koh HH, 'Transnational Legal Process' (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181
- Koh HH, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599

Press (events only)

- 'Appeal Court upholds SOCU's power to seize gold, cash in money laundering case' *News Room Guyana* (Georgetown, 11 May 2026)
- 'Money laundering case: Appeal Court affirms SOCU's legal power to seize gold, cash' *INews Guyana* (Georgetown, 12 May 2026)